IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT IN THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RIGO SIP 13 /M 7:50

1		CLERK'S OFFICE U.S.DISTAIDT COURT
2	EILEEN JEANETTE RODRIGUEZ-VAZQUEZ,	SAN JUAN, PR
3	Plaintiff,	1
4	v.	CIVIL NO. 97-2434 (RLA)
5	PUERTO RICO MANUFACTURING	,
6	EXTENSION, INC., et al.,	1
7	Defendants.	1
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FIFTH OMNIBUS ORDER DISPOSING OF OUTSTANDING MOTIONS SETTING DISCOVERY DEADLINES AND SCHEDULING PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL

The various outstanding motions in this action are hereby disposed of in this Order. Further, pretrial conference and trial dates are hereby scheduled.

I. DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS

The defendants have moved for dismissal of the claims asserted against them on various grounds. The Court having reviewed the pleadings as well as the documents in file hereby disposes of these motions as follows.

A. THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff instituted this action against (1) PUERTO RICO MANUFACTURING EXTENSION, INC. ("PRIMEX") and its executive director, (2) MIGUEL BURSET; (3) the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION; (4) FOMENTO INDUSTRIAL COMPANY ("PRIDCO") and its

7/10/99 5/c: Juny Clerk AO 72 (Rev 8/82) Eilen Rodugues

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administrator, (5) JAIME MORGAN-STUBBE, alleging her dismissal from

2 employment at PRIMEX was in violation of local law as well as

prompted by political animus.

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B. THE FACTS

PRIMEX is a manufacturing technology center established in

Puerto Rico through the initiative of the local Government.

PRIMEX began operations in April 1996.

Plaintiff was hired by PRIMEX as Marketing Manager effective May 13, 1996.

Plaintiff was dismissed from employment with PRIMEX effective

11 September 27, 1996 when her position was eliminated.

C. PRIDCO

PRIDCO has moved for dismissal of the claims asserted against it 14 alleging that plaintiff had no employment relationship with said 15 Movant submitted several documents in support of its 16 position which stand unchallenged. Plaintiff's response to the 17 18 dismissal request was limited to conclusory and unsubstantiated 19 allegations which are not sufficient to defeat a proper summary 20 judgment petition. Santiago v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 138 F.3d 1 (1st 21 Cir. 1998). Once a defendant submits a duly documented summary 22 judgment request, the burden shifts to plaintiff to present evidence 23 sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact; conclusory 24 allegations will not do. <u>Cadle Co. v. Hayes</u>, 116 F.3d 957 (1st Cir. 25 1997).

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Therefore, the uncontroverted evidence in the record leads to the inescapable conclusion that no employment relationship existed between plaintiff and PRIDCO which excepts codefendant from any potential liability in this action.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, filed by PRIDCO (docket No. 11)¹ is hereby **GRANTED** and the complaint filed against PRIDCO is **DISMISSED**. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

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D. PRIMEX and MIGUEL BURSET

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PRIMEX and BURSET moved for abstention as well as dismissal of various federal causes of action. Additionally, PRIMEX has claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity.

We shall address these arguments seriatim.

i. Parallel State Action

Defendants have requested our abstention pending appellate review of the dismissal, with prejudice, of a similar complaint filed by plaintiff in parallel state court proceedings. It appearing that the local proceedings have concluded and it further appearing that the P.R. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the previous dismissal should have been "without prejudice" this request is **DENIED AS MOOT**.

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 $[\]frac{25}{26}$ PRIDCO (docket No $\frac{47}{2}$).

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ii. Pullman Abstention

Movants further request abstention under the doctrine established in R.R. Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) alleging that plaintiff's claim involves an unsettled issue of state law. See also Pustell v. Lynn Public Sch., 18 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 1994).

Defendants frame the issue as follows:

In the case at bar, the fundamental question that surrounds all controversies is: whether the state Public Service Personnel Act covers an entity such as Primex (and its officials, such as Burset), thus guaranteeing to all its employees a right to a pre-termination hearing. This is an issue of strict state law: it calls for the interpretation not only of the Public Service Personnel Act, but also of the statutes, if any, that create entities such as Primex.

18 Motion to Dismiss... (docket No. 12) at 6.

Abstention in this regard depends on the nature of PRIMEX. However, the record is devoid of any information indicative of this necessary element. There is no documentation explaining by what authority it came into existence nor anything relating to its functions. Faced with this barren scenario the Court is in no position to rule on this matter nor of appraising the option of certifying the issue to the P.R. Supreme Court. See Reagan v. Racal

1 Mortg., Inc., 135 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1998); Pyle v. South Hadley Sch.

2 <u>Comm.</u>, 55 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, the petition to abstain on these grounds is DENIED.

iii. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

According to defendants, assuming arguendo that PRIMEX is a "quasi-public corporation" and/or "an operational branch" of the PUERTO RICO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION as averred in the complaint, then PRIMEX would be entitled to the protection of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. No additional arguments or documentation were provided by defendants in support of this position.

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the commencement and prosecution in federal court of suits claiming damages brought against any state, including Puerto Rico, without its consent. Torres v. Puerto Rico Tourism Co., 175 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 888 F.2d 940, 942 (1st Cir. 1989); Ramírez v. Puerto Rico Fire Service, 715 F.2d 694, 697 (1st Cir. 1983); Fernández v. Chardón, 681 F.2d 42, 59 n.13 (1st Cir. 1982).

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

1034, 1037 (1st Cir. 1987)).

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Eleventh Amendment immunity applies even though the state has not been named in the suit. Its protection is extended to governmental entities which are deemed an arm or alter ego of the state. The principal factors to weigh in determining whether or not a particular entity qualifies as an alter ego of a state, are whether the agency exercises a governmental or a proprietary function and whether an adverse judgment will be satisfied from public or separate agency funds. Royal Caribbean Corp. v. Puerto Rico Ports Authority, 973 F.2d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1992); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 888 2d at 943-44. In examining the nature of the agency's function, we must scrutinize it within the specific context of the claims asserted in the complaint. Royal Caribbean.

Additionally, the analysis should include consideration of "the agency's degree of autonomy; the power of the agency to sue and be sued and enter into contracts; whether the agency's property is immune from state taxation and whether the state has insulated itself from responsibility for the agency's operations." M/V Manhattan Prince, 897 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Ainsworth Aristocrat International Pty., Ltd. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 818 F.2d

The protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment to governmental entities is not automatic. Its applicability depends on a number of factors including the degree of administrative autonomy and fiscal independence enjoyed by the entity which, in this

1 particular case, remain unknown to the Court. Absent evidence of the

2 relevant facts essential to conducting a proper analysis, the Court

3 is unable to make a determination regarding the applicability of the

⁴ Eleventh Amendment immunity to the petitioning defendant.

Accordingly, PRIMEX's request for dismissal based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity is **DENIED**.

iv. Claims pursuant to § 1983

Defendants further contend that dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims is proper in that neither PRIMEX nor BURSET are "persons" within the meaning of the statute and that plaintiff has no property interest in her position.

13 It is evident that neither PRIMEX nor the other entities named
14 as defendants herein are "persons" within the meaning of this statute
15 and therefore, are not proper parties to this type of suit. See
16 Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 108 (1st Cir. 1991). Therefore,
17 no \$ 1983 cause of action lies against them.

As to whether or not plaintiff may pursue a § 1983 cause of action against BURSET a different approach is required. In this regard, a distinction must be made between claims advanced against codefendant in his individual capacity versus those made against him in his official capacity.

Actions asserted against government employees in their official

capacity are deemed actions against the state since the real party in

interest is the government and not the official and therefore,

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subject to Eleventh Amendment protection. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.

2 21, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). Suits against officers in

3 their official capacity for damages are tantamount to actions

4 directly against the state and barred by the aforementioned immunity.

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.Ct. 2304,

6 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989).

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On the other hand, BURSET is subject to individual liability under § 1983 provided plaintiff is able to establish the necessary elements of a cause of action, i.e., deprivation of a federal right under color of state law." "bv а person Barrios v. AEELA, 84 F.3d 487, 491 (1st Cir. 1996). Any judgment entered against BURSET in these proceedings pursuant to § 1983 would have to be paid by him personally unless he is covered by P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 32 § 3085 (1990) in which case judgment would be satisfied from Puerto Rico funds.

There is no information available in the record at this time for the Court to make a determination regarding the suitability of a § 1983 claim against BURSET in his personal capacity nor whether or not plaintiff held a proprietary interest in her position at PRIMEX.

21 See King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965, 969 (1st Cir. 1997).

Accordingly, the § 1983 claim asserted against PRIMEX and the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION² are hereby **DISMISSED**.

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²⁶ The remaining non-individual defendants.

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1 It is further ORDERED that the request to dismiss the § 1983 2 claim against BURSET is **DENIED**.

v. Claim pursuant to § 1985

4 Absent any allegation³ of conduct justifying a conspiracy, defendants' dismiss request to the claims asserted under 6 42 U.S.C. § 1985 is GRANTED. See Romero Barcelo v. Hernandez 7 Agosto, 75 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1996) (class based discriminatory animus 8 and overt acts must be identified).

Accordingly, the § 1985 claims asserted in the complaint are DISMISSED.

12 vi. <u>COBRA</u>

Absent opposition and it appearing that defendants' arguments are correct, the claims asserted in the complaint under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. \$ 1161 et seq. are hereby DISMISSED.

E. MORGAN-STUBBE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

Codefendants JAIME MORGAN-STUBBE and the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION have moved for dismissal based on abstention and Eleventh Amendment grounds.

i. Abstention

The arguments regarding abstention pending parallel proceedings as well as those based on the $\underline{Pullman}$ doctrine having been already

²⁶ Plaintiff did not address this argument in her opposition.

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disposed of in this Order and codefendants having failed to add any further arguments to justify their petition, this request is **DENIED**.

ii. <u>Eleventh Amendment</u>

The only argument advanced by the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION to claim Eleventh Amendment protection is that the "there is no question about [it] being a governmental agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico." Motion to Dismiss (docket No. 15) at 5. However, this conclusory statement by itself is insufficient for the Court to make a determination on this issue.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claims against the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION based on Eleventh Amendment coverage is **DENIED**.

F. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment, filed by PRIDCO (docket No. 11);⁴ the Motion to Dismiss... filed by PRIMEX and BURSET (docket No. 12)⁵ and the Motion to Dismiss, filed by JAIME MORGAN-STUBBE and the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (docket No. 15)⁶ are **GRANTED** but limited to:

⁵ See also Reply... filed by PRIMEX and BURSET (docket No;. 38).

⁶ <u>See also Reply...</u> filed by JAIME MORGAN-STUBBE (docket No. **45**). The Informative Motion filed by codefendant (docket No. **43**) is NOTED.

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The claims asserted against PRIDCO are hereby **DISMISSED**.

The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims asserted against PRIMEX and the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION are hereby **DISMISSED**.

The 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims asserted in the complaint are hereby DISMISSED.

The COBRA claims asserted in the complaint are hereby DISMISSED.

II. CURRENT STATUS OF CODEFENDANT

The Special Appearance by the Secretary of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (docket No. 41) advising that codefendant the ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION had ceased to exist and that all its "functions, powers and duties" have been transferred to PRIDCO is NOTED.

III. PLAINTIFF'S LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The Motion Submitting Plaintiff's Address and Renewing Leave to Withdraw, filed by MARLENE APONTE CABRERA, ESQ. (docket No. 58) is GRANTED.

Accordingly, MS. APONTE CABRERA is relieved from further participation in his case.8

It is further ORDERED that until new counsel enters an appearance on plaintiff's behalf copy of this Order as well as all

The Informative Motions filed by the Secretary of Justice (dockets No. 42 and 44) are NOTED.

⁸ See also Motion for Leave to Withdraw... (docket No. 54).

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motions and orders filed in this case hereinafter shall be served
directly to plaintiff as follows:

EILEEN JEANNETTE RODRIGUEZ VAZQUEZ
5546 NW 101 Court
Miami, Fla. 33178

IV. DISCOVERY

It appearing that plaintiff has had ample opportunity to procure new legal representation in that she has been on notice of her attorney's wish to withdraw since early this year, discovery in this case shall proceed according to the following deadlines.

11/1/99 Deadline for parties to propound written discovery.

12/15/99 Deadline for plaintiff to identify expert witnesses.

13 1/14/2000 Deadline for defendants to identify expert witnesses

14 1/14/2000 Deadline for plaintiff's expert witness reports.

15 1/31/2000 Deadline for depositions of parties and fact

witnesses.

2/15/2000 Deadline for defendant's expert witness reports.

2/29/2000 Deadline for depositions of all expert witnesses.

V. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND TRIAL

A PRETRIAL/SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE, to be held before the undersigned, sis hereby scheduled for April 4, 2000 at 2:30 p.m.

The parties shall contact the undersigned's chambers to verify where the conference will be held.

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A Proposed Joint Pretrial Order¹⁰ shall be filed **on or before**March 28, 2000, and shall contain the following:

I. Nature of the Case

A statement of the nature of the case agreed upon by all parties which shall include issues of jurisdiction. In the event that the parties cannot agree upon a single description, separate versions shall be submitted.

II. Theories of the Parties

Each party shall present concisely its pertinent legal theories including applicable citations to statutes and caselaw. Counsel are directed to fully disclose all trial issues since the Proposed Joint Pretrial Order will supersede the pleadings in establishing the issues to be heard and considered at trial.

III. Admitted Facts

The parties shall provide a comprehensive listing of all admitted or stipulated facts.

IV. Contested Facts

The parties shall provide a listing of contested facts.

V. List of Exhibits

This section shall contain a listing of all exhibits
which have been pre-marked/numbered. Each exhibit shall be

 $^{^{25}}$ 10 A courtesy copy to be delivered directly to the chambers of the undersigned.

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identified by a descriptive title as well as its identification number. The parties shall indicate those exhibits, if any, which are not objected to by opposing counsel.

VI. Depositions

The party wishing to use deposition testimony at trial shall list the depositions. Additionally, designations and objections shall be submitted in accordance with the undersigned's STANDING ORDER FOR CIVIL TRIALS issued on February 10, 1994.

VII. Witnesses and Interpreters

Each party shall identify witnesses to be presented at trial and include a brief, one paragraph, offer of proof.

Additionally, the parties shall specifically identify those witnesses who will need the services of a court-certified interpreter during trial.

VIII. Expert Witnesses and Interpreters

Each party shall list its expert witnesses and include his/her curriculum vitae and an offer of proof. If an expert report has been produced, the report shall be submitted in conjunction with the offer of proof. Additionally, the parties shall specifically identify those experts who will need the services of a court-certified interpreter during trial.

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IX. Itemized Statement of Special Damages

In anticipation that the issue of special damages may arise, an itemized statement of special damages shall be incorporated into the Proposed Joint Pretrial Order. The party or parties not in agreement with the proposed statement shall include its/their opposition in this section.

The Proposed Joint Pretrial Order may be modified by this Court

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X. Estimated Length of Trial

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Parties shall indicate the estimated length of trial.

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only upon a showing of good cause.

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JURY TRIAL

TRIAL in this action hereby set for April 11, 2000 at 9:30 a.m.

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STANDING ORDER

The parties shall file a TRIAL BRIEF, PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, PROPOSED VOIR DIRE and PROPOSED VERDICT FORM¹¹ no later than **April 7**, **2000** in accordance with the undersigned's STANDING ORDER FOR CIVIL TRIALS issued on **February 10**, **1994**.

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Courtesy copies of all these documents shall be delivered directly to the chambers of the undersigned.

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The parties shall make the necessary arrangements with the courtroom deputy clerk to have the evidence marked prior to trial. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. day of September, 1999. San Juan, Puerto Rico, this L. ACOSTA RAYMOND United States District Judge

The parties shall furnish the undersigned an additional copy of all documents intended to be presented as evidence at trial.

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2		SUMMARY OF DEADLINES AND SETTINGS
3		
4	11/1/99	Deadline for parties to propound written discovery.
5	12/15/99	Deadline for plaintiff to identify expert witnesses.
6	1/14/2000	Deadline for defendants to identify expert witnesses
7	1/14/2000	Deadline for plaintiff's expert witness reports.
8	1/31/2000	Deadline for depositions of parties and fact
9		witnesses.
10	2/15/2000	Deadline for defendant's expert witness reports.
11	2/29/2000	Deadline for depositions of all expert witnesses.
13	3/28/2000	Deadline for filing JOINT PRETRIAL ORDER
14	4/4/2000	PRETRIAL/SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE at 2:30 p.m.
15	4/7/2000	Deadline for filing TRIAL BRIEF, PROPOSED JURY
16		INSTRUCTIONS, PROPOSED VOIR DIRE and PROPOSED
17		VERDICT FORM
18	***	Parties to mark evidence prior to trial
19	***	Parties to provide the court copy of all documents
20		intended to be presented as evidence at trial.
21	4/11/2000	JURY TRIAL at 9:30 a.m.
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